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Themistius on Concept Acquisition
and Knowledge of Essences
by Myrna Gabbe (Dayton)

Abstract: Themistius's (ca. 317- ca. 388 C.E.) paraphrase of the De Anima is an influential
and important work; however, it is not now regarded as profound or original and thereby
sutTers from neglect. I argue that Themistius is misunderstood on the matter of Aristotle's
productive and potential intellects. It is commonly held that Themistius gives to the pro~uctive intellect the role of illuminating images in order to produce universal thoughts
In the potential intellect with epistemic certainty. I argue that Themistius's productive
intellect does not transform images to reveal the forms contained therein, but gives to the
potential intellect the ability, first, to organize our sense-experiences in the course of acquiring rudimentary universal concepts and, then, to discover the forms of things by ordinary discursive thinking.

J

Themistius (ca. 317- ca. 388 C.E.) was once an influential philosopher. His
paraphrases of Aristotle's treatises were studied from Late Antiquity
through the Renaissance and translated into Syriac, Arabic, Hebrew and
Latin . J Arguably, his paraphrase of the De Anima is his most important
Work, as its influence can be seen in the writings of Averroes and Thomas
Aquinas. 2 However, this treatise is not now regarded as profound or illuminating and it, thereby, suffers from neglect. 3

Extant are his paraphrases on the Posterior Ana/yties, Physics, De Anima, De Caelo
and Metaphysics /I.; now lost are his exegeses of the Categories, Prior Analytics and
Topics. See Todd 2003 for a complete survey and history ofThemistius's work.
2 For Themistius's influence on the Christian and Islamic medieval philosophers, see,
e. g. , Verbeke 1957, Mahoney 1973, Davidson 1992, and Taylor 2007.
3 Hamelin 1953,38 f writes: "Apn':s Alexandre, la seule interpretation profonde et originale de la tMorie de l'intellect [ ... J c'est I' interpretation des Alexandrins. Or on se
tromperait en la cherchant dan s Themistius: on n'en trouverait que des traces. [ ... ]
Bien qu 'a propos de l' intellect il quitte un moment Ie genre de la paraphrase pour celui
du commentaire, ses developpements gardent toujours ce caractere Iitteral qui fait de
lui un interprete utile et sur pour l'intelligence verbale d 'Aristote, rna is pauvre en
aperyus profonds sur la pensee du maitre. " Blumenthal 1977,253 expresses a simi lar
sentiment, noting in passing th at Themistius is not a profound interpreter of Aristotle.
And Balleriaux 1994 does not think him astute enough to see the obvious contradictions in his supposed theory of the emotions. Indeed, contemporary scholars are
I
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Themistius is in part to blame for the present day reception of this exegesis. He wrote paraphrases, rather than lengthy commentaries to enable
tho e limited in time to return to a study of Aristotle' works.4 B~t his summary sty le gives the impression that his understanding of the text is superficial, and this leads the reader to wonder whether he approached it with a
ystematic interpretive strategy. The vicw of recent scholar i that he did
not. On his methodology, Pamela Huby writes: "lIe looks close ly at each
section as he comes to it, and tries to make sense of it by relating it to other
sections on a elective basis". ]n her view, "we have only a partial accou nt,
and the parts do not add up to a coherent whole". s But even if Huby's description were accurate, Themistius's De Animo would still warrant a careful study. It is the earliest surviving commentary on the De AII/II/a; it is a significant source for Theophrastus on the intellect; and it influenced the
thought of medieval and Renaissance philosophers.6 However, I hope to
show that her assessment is not correct.
In this essay I argue that Themistius is misunderstood on the matter of
Aristotle's productive and potential intellects. It is commonly held that
Themistius gives to the productive intellect the role of illuminating imageS
in order to produce universal thoughts with epistem ic certainty in its potential counterpart. This problematic theory was once co mm on ly attrib uted to
Aristo tle and , though it is not now in favor, is st ill widely attributed to his
Peripatetic successor. I argue that Themistius's prod uctive intellect does
not provide insight by transforming images or illuminating forms contained
therein. It gives to the potential intellect the abi lity, first, to organize our
sense-experiences in the course of acquiring rudimentary univer a l concepts, and, then, to discover the forms and essences by ordinary di cursive
thinking.

II

Ar istotle distinguishes between the productive and potential intellects in De
Anima illS. Ob erving that in the who le of nature one thing serves a
matter for each kind, somethin g else as ca use and producer, he concludes

4

5

6

quick to attribute natfooted interpretation of Aristotle to Themistius and the ancient
Greek commentators more generall y. See notes 20 an d 24.
Sec the proem to Themistius's paraphrase of the Posterior Analytic.l· and page 3 of the
introduction to Todd's 1996 translation of Themistius's paraphrase of the De Anima.
Huby 1991, 142. Tuominen 2009 , 25 makes a sim il ar observation: "Themistius is not
striving for unity in his accounts of various issues. Rather, he aims to clarify the point
at hand, and such clarifications may contain interpretative trends that pu ll the resulting whole in different directions". Todd 1996,4 7, with some hesitation, agrees with
this assessment.
Sec, e.g., Mahoney 1982.
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~hat the e difference likewise belong to the soul (430al0- 14): one SOlt of
Intellect serve as matter by its capacity to become all things, the other as
cause by its power to produce all things (430aI4f.). The former is typ ically
held to be the seat of human in tellection because in De Anima III 4 Aristotle
tells us that the intellect thinks and knows by becoming the objects of
thought7 - the forms or essences of material, mathematical and immaterial
SUbstances. The assimilation model of thinking mirrors the causal structure
?f sensing: both thinking and sensing take place when the faculties become
Isomorphic with their objects. The intellect that thinks and knows is called
the potential intellect (8vvCq..lEI vovs) because the intellect must be its objects
potentially in order to become and know them actually (429al 5f.; a27- 29).
he productive intellect (lTOIT]TIKOS vovs), by contrast, is responsible for the
Intelligibility of the material world.
It is unclear what the productive and potential intellects are - if indeed
they are intellect and not imply aspects thereof. Aristotle ascribes to the
productive intellect divine characteristics. It is separate (430aI7; a22) , in its
essence activity (430aI8), and alone immortal and eternal (430a23) . Howe.v er, he al 0 ugge ts that it belongs to the human soul (430a13 f.). ThemistlUS takes Aristotle a describing a transcendent yet immanent noetic ent ity,
but, unlike Alexand er of Aphrodisias, he does not believe it to be the prime
mover. Themistius envisions the productive intellect as a kind of sou l as form inhering in matter. It is the highest and most valuable of forms in
the natural world becau e it does not serve as matter to an ontologically
superior form (In de an . 100,33 37). In defense of his interpretation, he
appeals to Aristotle 's assertion that it "alone is immortal and eternal"
(430a23). Reminding us that Aristotle recognizes a plurality of immortal
and eternal divine beings (103,10- 13),8 he argues that this description can
apply to the prod uctive in tellect only if it is understood to con trast the productive intellect with other capacities of the human soul (103, 13- 15).
. The potential intellect may be more perplexing than even the productive
Illtellect. As Themistius explains, the developmental and discursive nature
of human thought demands that our intellect be potential in some way.
Potentiality is the state from which our thoughts and abilities develop, and
the condition that enables us to transition from one thought to the next
(94, 11 13). The problem is that Aristotle appears to endorse an intellect
that lacks all formal a nd material qualities (a noetic equiva lent of prime
matter) on the assumption that only a pure potentia lity is capable of know-

:r

7

8

See, e. g., De 0/1. 429a 15 f.; 429b51: ; and 430a3 5.
Th emistiu s has in mind the unmoved movers described in Metaphysics /\ 8. But it is
interes tin g to no te th a t Ari totle does not describe either the divine inte llect or the
unm oved move rs as immo rtal, onl y as e ternal. Tha t Aristotle uses the word "immorta l" to des~ ribe the p roduc tive intellect may be an indication that, as Them istius sugges ts, thIS Inte llec t ca nn o t be identified with the divine intellect.
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ing all things (429a 18 20). The intellect, he argues, cannot possess form of
it own, for then it would, like God, be unable to acquire forms other than
those it already pos esse. Thi is becau e one's formal qualities characterize onc's nature, 0 that, should the intellect take on diffcrent forms by
thinking new and different thought, it would tray from its nature. Ari totIe thereby reasons that the intellect cannot be anything in actuality before it thinks (429a24), and thereby a lso denies that it lacks a bodily organ
(429a24 27). Themi tius sugge t that the intcllect cou ld not use an organ
because its perceptual qualities, such as it being hot or cold, wou ld interfere with the activity of thought (94,32 34).9
Thcmistius may treat the potential intellect as a noetic entity existing separately from the human so ul (he describes it as co min g to exist in (106, I 0)
and being receivcd by us (104,14», but he appears to be aware that doing
so is problematic. Not only does he report Theophrastus' objection to this
line of interpretatiol1,l o he twice remarks dcfensively that Aristotle explicitly describes the intellect as such (105,30; 34f.). Still, it is not clear ju t
how Themistiu conceives of this noetic entity. He calls it th e "forerunncr
(lTp650iJos) of thc prod uctive in tellect" (103 ,30) , exp la inin g that it is "as the
[sun's] ray is to daylight" (103,31). This comparison, in turn , allows him
to claim that the productive intellect is more separate than its potential
forerunner (106,7). Is, then, the potential intellect causally dependcnt on its
productive counterpart as the sun's rays to the sun? Themistius does not say.
But because his intellect is devoid of actuality, it lacks the agency required
for the acquisition of knowledge and its transition to a tatc of active
thought. Themistius explains that the productive intellect perfects its potential counterpart by channeling (ElTOXETEVETCXI, 100,22) its forms to it like
a carpenter or smith who could permeate his materials th orough ly (99, 16f.).
He insist that the union of the two noetic entities produces the human
intellect, which has " two definitions - one of matter, the other of creativity"
(99,19). But in his view, the compounded intellect does not constitute the
essences of human beings because the productive intellect is the So urce for
our ability to do distinctly human thin gs (100,20- 22). Thus, by his account,
our humanity is explained on appeal to a single transcendent intellect, and
not by so mething that situates us more firmly in the sensible and a nimal
world.

9

10

Scholars debate the form of Aristotle's argume nt beginning at 429a 18. I am here following Themistius' articulation of the argument. Sec, e. g., Shields 1995; Sisko 1999;
and Politis 200 I for alternative renderings.
About the intellect's na ture, Theophrastus purportedly wrote: "Fo r that it is nothin g
in actu a lit y, but all thin gs potentiality, in just the sa me way as [the capacity for senseperception], is well-said. For it mu st not be taken in this way, that it is not even itself
(for that is captious), but as bei ng some underlying capacity as in the case of material
entities" (107,33 35). For a fuller disc us ion of this fragment, see Gabbe 2008a.
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One might wonder how the productive in tellect can permeate and transmit its activ ity to the potential intellect, when its activity is so different from
our own. What principally di tin guis hes the productive from the potential
in tellect is its being activi ty in essence (430a 18). Themistius understa nds
thi s description to mean that the productive intellect is precisely the same
as its objects. We may recall that th e potential intellect, when in active contemplation, is a lso what it think s. However, because it thinks discursively,
its nature ca nnot be tied to its activity. Ifit were, it would be essentially different from one thought to the nex t a nd , when not active, would not even
be itself. I I Conversely, because the productive intellect is essentially what
it thinks, it does not think at one moment but not at the next, its thinking is
not uccessive, a nd , unlike the potential intellect which acquires knowledge
thro ugh sense-perception and the sepa ration of form from m atter, it does
not depend on an ex ternal object for its activity. Its thinkin g, we are told , is
non-discursive insofar as it i immed iate and does not pass from form to
form: "It has all the forms all together and presents a ll of them to itself at the
same time. For o nly in this way would its essence a nd its activity be, as Aristotle says, identical" (100,10f.). Themistius appeals to the potential intellec t's stat us as noe tic matter to ex plain how it can receive the productive
intellect's activity but not its nature. Our understanding of the received
forms is ' divided ', he ex plains, because of the character of the intellect that
receives them. The potential intell ect cognizes th e forms by means of discursive thought, because the potential intellect is as matter for its productive
co unterpart and matter particularize , pluralizes and divides (100,22- 26).
Themistius defends the tenabil ity of transcendent-immanency by drawing a parallel to the sun a nd its light. He writes:
The intellect that illumin ates (eAAcX\.l1TWV) is prim arily one, while th ose that are illuminated (EAAa\.l1T6~EvOI) and that illumin ate (EAM~TroVTES) are, just like light, more than
onc. For whilc the sun is one, yo u co uld speak of light as in a sense di vided among the
organs of sight. That is why Aristotle introduced as a compa ri son not the sun but [its
derivativeJl ight [.. .J. (103,32 35)12

The idea seems to be that, like daylight, the productive intellect remains one
though divided. However, scho lars are not agreed on the interpretation
of this passage. The source of the ambiguity lies with the participles
EAAcqmwv, EAAO"mOI-\EVOI and EAACxI-\TIOVTES, for it is not obvious what they
refer to or how much emp hasis they shou ld be given. Ve rbeke, following
Siger of Brabant, takes them all to refer to the prod uctive intellect(s) .13 In
th eir view, Themistius recognizes a plurali ty of subordinate productive inII Priscian records Theophrastus as hav ing made the very same observation. See III de

seils. 29,18 23 and 30,22 25.
12 With only minor modifications, trans lations of the In de all. are from Todd 1996.
11 See Verbeke 1957 for a survey of the historical interpretations ofThem istius's productive intellect.
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tellects in addition to a sing le superior one. The ubordinate intellects are
thought to illuminate the potential intellect from the illumination they receive from the principal productive intellect. The multip le productive intellects are, thus, both EAAa~.lTTojJEVOI and EAACxjJlTOVTES. Aquinas, by contrast,
denies the unity of the productive intellect altogether. On his view, each individual has her own productive intellect illuminated by God (EAACxjJlTWv),
which in turn illuminates her own potential intellect. Taking each participle
to refer to a different noetic entity, he thereby reads EAACxjJlTOVTES as referring to our unique productive intellects and EAAajJlTojJEvOI to Our potential
intellects. Yet th ere are many who remain unconvinced that Themistius recognizes a plurality of productive intellects. Averroes, llenry Bate ofMalines
and M. Bruno Nardi maintain that Themistius's productive intellect is capable of communicating itself to a plurality of souls without losing its unity.
Indeed, though Themistius notes that one could speak (EIlTOlS) of light a divided by the objects it illuminates (103,34), he earlier says that light is principally one because the source of li ght, the sun , is one (103,22 f.). Moreover,
Themistius argued in the preceding lin es th at there cou ld not be a plurality
of productive intell ects because a multiplicity ofproduetive intellects would
require differentiation by a di tinguishing feature - either form or matter
(103,20- 32). But if productive intell ects cannot possess matter, neither can
they differ in their forms or activities. Were they to differ from one another
in term of what they think, an exp lanat ion would be needed as to why individuals rece ived the intellects they did. And if a n in dividual received a
productive intellect that did not think all of its forms, that per on cou ld not
think all things, despite Aristotle's in si tence to the contrary (429a 18). The
productive intellect, Themistius conclude, must be one to en ure mutual
understanding. "Where otherwi e", he asks, "do the sha red notions (Kolval
EVVOlOl) come from? Where is the untaught and id entica l understanding of
the primary definitions (lTPWTWV 8pwv) and primary axioms (lTPWTWV
Cx~IWjJCxTWV) derived from?" ( 103,38 104,2).

III

Themistius maintains that the productive intell ect is in some way responsible for the acqu isition and contemplation of the objects of thought. "The
actual intellect", he reports, "advances the potential intellect, and not only
makes it an actual intellect, but also constitutes its potentia l objects of
thought (TO 8VVCxjJEl VOllTO) as actual objects (EVEpyEi<;x VOllTO)" (99, I 3).
Our goa l is to understand how it does so.
In Aristotle's view, the objects of thought (VOllTCx) are the intelligible
forms that account for essenti a l natures. Articulation of an object's intelligibl e form wi ll answer the question: What is it to be that object? And because Aristotle holds that forms belong to ens ibl e objects, he believes that
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know ledge derives from ense-perception and imagination, the faculty that
~~etal~s sens~ impressions. " The objects of thou ghts (TCx VOllTCx) ", he writes,
are In sen sib le forms (l:v TOIS E'ioEm TOIS o i<J611ToIS) [... J and th erefore, no
one can learn or understand anythin g wit hout sense-perceiving" (432a4- 8).
For this reason , he con tinues, "when o ne thinks, one necessarily thinks
a long with a n im age (cq..lo <pOVTcX<JJ..!OTI)" (432a8f.) . It is not clear how Aristo tl e conceives the ro le of im ages in thinking. He elsewhere describes intel !ection a thinking the form in the im age (l:v TOIS <pOvTcX<JJ..!om, 43 I b2). What
1 certain is that images have particularity and are therefore not thoughts.
But because they conta in or represent the form of sensible objects, they are
aptly described as intelligibles in potency.
Accord in g to Themistius, the productive intellect ena bl es us to grasp the
form of an object thanks to its act ion 0 11 both the potential intellect and the
intellig ibles in potency. He writes:
As light whcn supervenin g o n pot ential sight and pOlential co lors produces both actu a l
sight and actua l colors, so too this ac tua l intellect advance th e potentia l intellect, an d
not on ly makes it a n actu a l intellect, but a lso renders its potential objects o f thou ght as
actu a l objects. (98 ,35 99,2)

The comparison made here between the productive intellect and light has
its source in th e De Anima . Aristotle there writes that the productive intellect is "as a state (ws E~ I S TIS) su ch as light, for in a manner li ght makes
potential co lors act ua l" (430aIS- 17) . Yet, on his theory, li ght actualizes the
visua l faculty as well as colors.1 4 His a nalogy thu s su ggests that the productive intellect plays the dual role attributed to it by T hemistius. Still, we must
ask how far Themistius means to press th e compari son. Does he take it to
show simp ly that the productive intellect actua li zes the potential intell ect
a nd its objects both , or does he a lso conceive it to show how the actualiza tion is accomplished? The difficulty is that Themistius, on th e one ha nd ,
emp loys the im ile of li ght and the language of illumination, but, on the
other ha nd , writes that the productive intellect " ch a nnel s (l:TroXETEVETat) its
activity to the potential intell ect" ( 100,22), " fully co nstitutes its disposition
[for thinking]" (E~IV KOTO<JKEVcX~EI, 98,32) and " is most like a god ; for god is
ind eed in one way the things that a re themselves, but in a nother their suppli e r" (XOPlly6S, 99,24f.). O ur aim is to reconcile the claims that knowled ge
is co mmunicated directly from the productive intell ect, but is also acquired
through its act ion on both th e potential intellect and the po tentially intelligibl e.
Th ere are a number of ways to approach this interpretive probl em. We
might, for instance, downplay the significa nce of the lig ht analogy by rejectin g the idea that Themi tius espo Ll sed a th eory of illumination. Co nversely,

14

For detail s on light's nature and ro le in vi ion , see A ri sto tle's De all. 418£126 b20 and
Seils. 438b2 16.

222

Myrna Gabbe

we might take e ri ous ly his language of illuminat ion a nd , instead, deemph asize the productive intell ect' role as communicator of form . The prevailing view is that the productive intell ect operates like li ght in the most litera l ense. D av idso n even cha racteri zes Themi ti an intellectio n in term s of
perception. 15 He writes:
I n other words, the active intelleet , funetioning as a sort of ligh t, activates both images
in the sou l, wh ich are potential thoughts, and th e hum a n potential intelleet; a nd it
th e reby enables th e potential intellect to perceive actual thoughts a nd to beeome act ual
itself. (Dav idso n 1992, 26 . The empha sis is m ine.)

To take Themistius's use of'light' at face va lu e is to a cribe to him a theory
of illumination according to which the intellection of for ms is both immediate a nd infa llibl e. For this interpretive approach treats the acquisitio n of
form s as directly ana logou to the activity of seeing. Aristotle holds that
one wi ll stra ightaway see when the appro priate condition s obtain (when
there is li ght and the eyes are properly functi oning) , because seeing doc not
develop and prog ress through the course of time. To use hi expres ion , as
soon as one sees one has see n . 16 Further, it is hi s view that one cannot err
wi th regard to the proper objec ts (418a 14 f.). Error in perceptio n does Occur,
but, he expla ins, on ly in the judgment of what is perceived and where it is.
(If, for in tance, a woman ees yellow beca use of jaundice, her sen in g of
ye ll ow is accurate because her eyes a re yellow, though her jud gment that her
env irons are yellow is not.)
On the theory of illumination common ly attributed to Themistiu s, the
acq ui sition of forms (as opposed th eir eo ntemplation)l ? is made immediate
by the illuminative powers of th e producti ve intellect. So while our knowledge is derived from sense-perce ption , our expe riences se rve only as preparatio n for the und ersta ndin g achieved throu gh thi s divine or divine-like
operation. Therefore, the acq ui sition of for ms does not require either reOection or the app lication of a methodological procedure to our expe riences. If,

15

16
17

See a lso Moraux 1978,3 11 ; Taylor 2007, 136; and Verbeke, 1957 , LVII I. Comparing
Themistius's int erp reta ti on to Aquinas's, who endorses a rob ust theory of illumination, Verbeke writes: "[oo .]Ia difference e ntre Themistius ct sa int Thomas eo nsiste
dans Ie fait que, pour ee dernier, I' aetio n de I'intelleet age nt se rapporte uniqu eme nt
aux donnees se nsiblcs en vue de les rendre intellig ibles, landis que pour Ie eo mmen ta teur gree I'aeti o n de I'intellect aetif vise direetement I' intellect reeeptif et les inte lligibles en pui sa nee: les deux sont direetement aetualises par I'i ntelleet aelif."
See Meta. e 6, 1048b23, b33; a nd Seils. 6, 446b2 f.
Ari totle says th a t as soon as one und e rsta nd s, o ne ha s und e rstood, a nd as Soo n as
one thinks, one has th o ught ( I 048b23 f.). But we need no t think th at he is here making
refere nce to th e immediate and infallible 'procc s' by wh ich we come to possess th e
forms. Aristotle may o nly mean th at the ac ti vi ty of thinkin g is complete i. e., nonprogres ·ive. And it is a truism th at o ne ca nn ot be in erro r with regards to what one
knows. Thus, the th eory that th e con templa ti o n of forms is both immediate and infallible is unproblematic.
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for instance, we wanted to know what it is to be a hum a n being, we n eed no t
ask ourselve what distinguishes human bein gs from other animals or what
specia l features we have that are most sa lie nt for explaining what we a re.
And surveyin g the op ini ons of o ur predecessors wiII provide no insi ght into
Our investigation. The presence of the right im age is, theoretica IIy, a II that is
necessa ry for the apprehen sion of form. Moreover, one cannot be mi staken
about the things that a re sa li ent to an exp la nation of what x is or why x is so.
Because o ur knowledge is owed to the activity of a transce nd ent noetic entity, th ere is no roo m for error. T hu s, th e prevai ling view takes Themistius to
en d orse a theory of in tuiti on - a kind of non-discursive, or non-inferenti a l,
thinking. There is, in ad dition, a more radica l form of non-discursive thinking - namely, thinking that is non-propositional. Th is form of co nsciousness involves thinking a n o bj ect of th o ught without thinking anyth in g
about it. I sha II in due cou rse di scuss whether either type of thinkin g h as a
place in Themist ia n noetics. But we might first note that Aristotle was simila rl y thought to have espo used such a theory.
One co uld easi ly conclude from the opening lines to his di scuss ion of vovs
th at Ar isto tl e end orses an iIIumination theory of in teIIection. Fo r his investi gation proceeds on the ass umption that th inkin g is analogous to sensing
(429a13 18). Furt hermore, by caIIin g th e inteIIi gible objects ' indivisibles'
(TO: 6:010(pETO, De an. III 6, 430a26, b6) a nd ' incomposites ' (TO: O:CJVV8ETO,
Me /a . e 10, 105 1b 17) a nd asserting that they are known by contact (81YETv,
105 1b24), " in a si mple time and by a simpl e act of the so ul " (430b 15),18 he
seems to uggest that the objects of thought are grasped by a special mode
of intellection - one that necessar ily yield s the truth. 19 And these remarks,
in turn, appear to support a reading of th e last chapter of the Posterior AnaIy /ics, whereby A ri stotle was thought to treat vovs as an intuitive facu lty
res po nsibl e fo r the app rehension of the first principles. 20 However, the view
that we intuit the inte lligible objects is currently out of favor and it is not
hard to see why. The id ea that our kn ow ledge of form s is acquired by an a ct
of in tuition or iIIuminative abstraction runs counter to our experiences. On
this view, the apprehens ion offorms sho ul d be neither labori o us nor subject
to error, when the history of philosophy attests to the diffic ulty of articu lating definitions. And as M. F rede points out, such a view suppo ses that we
acquire forms indi vidua IIy a nd in a piecemeal fashion. 21 But understanding
what somethin g is involves discerning its essential features, ex plaining how
18

19

20
21

Be rti 1978 provides a non-intu itio nist acco unt o f Aristotk 's ind ivi ibles and incomposites. Yet wit h little explana ti o n, he tics Themistius to th e view that Aristotle's use
o f th e e terms demon strates that he ascribes to a fo rm o f P laton ic intuitionism. See, in
pa rti cular, page 146 and note 28.
See De all. III 6, 430a 26 f. ; b29 C; Meta. e 10, 105 1b25 f.
This, for in ·ta nce, is W. D. Ross ' read in g. Sec pages 47- 5 1 of his introdu cti on to his
tex t an d co mmenta ry of Aristo tle' Prior alld Posterior Al1aly tics.
See Fred e 1996, 17 1 for his account o f concept acqu isiti o n.
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these feature relate to its other nece sary but non-e ential a ttributes, and
articulating how this object relates to other thin gs and phenomena. Therefore, the acquisition of forms is co ntin gent upon su ndry experiences and inchoate bits of knowledge a ll of which need to be generali zed, sys temati zed
a nd structured. F ina lly, the acts involved in intuition are difficult to understand. Most troubling is the notion that im ages are ubj ect to tran sformation that en mattered forms, th e form s of natura l a nd mathematical
object which are someh ow latent in the images sto red in memory, need to
be actu a li zed before the potential intellect can gras p hold or them. If the
productive intellect were to act on images so as to render th em capable of
affectin g or, as it were, bein g 'seen' by the potential intellect, they wou ld
have to be made universal and incorporea l that is, they would have to be
tran formed into a thought. But such a theory makes the potential intellect
redundant, because it a ll ows th ere to be thou g hts without Intellects thi nking them. 22
R eturnin g to Themistius, we mi ght ask why interpreters so often sup pose
him to end o r e a theory o f illumin ation. R. Taylor, who offers the best reaso n , beli eves Themistius's productive intellect to be the SO urce for our
knowledge by thinkin g the extent of what we can know. His readin g hin ges
on the a mbiguity of passage 103,32- 35, wherein Themistius makes mention
of the illuminatin g (EAACxI.l1TOVTES) a nd illuminated (EAACq.mO I.lEV01) intell ects.
Taylor take Themistius to recognize a single transcendent productive intellect th at enge nd ers a multitude of imma nent illuminating intell ects. On his
interpretati o n, these so-called 'actu a l intellects' produce knowledge by the
illumina tive power they derive from th e content of the productive intellect's
thought,23 T he subo rdin ate intell ec ts, he hold s, do not think the form s lest
we all sha re the sa me knowledge. 24 The human intellect produces its own

On th e a 'sumpti on that (a) th e se nses perceive o nl y sensible qu a lities li ke co lo rs,
smell s, so unds a nd (b) images arc mere by-products o f the senses' ac tivity. C. 11 . Kahn
argues th a t the intellection of form cannot proceed by th e tra nsformation o r actua li Za ti on of images. "Otherwise", he writes, "some thin g would come from no thin g ( ... beca use] we do not perceive ei th e r that th ey a rc individuals or th a t they a rc ofa definite
kind" (Ka hn 198 1,407). Kahn 's sugges ti o n, ultimately, is that th e intellect must have
a n intimate relat io n with t he senses in order to acco unt for th e way humans perceive.
Perception for us is co ncept lade n a nd , hence, requires th e in vo lve ment of the intellect.
This involvement, in turn , makes the ab tract io n of fo rm from images unn ecessa ry,
mce th e 1I11 eliect mu t a lready possess conce pts for images to se rve as th e basis for abstracti ve intellecti on. Kahn docs not attr ibute to The mi stius a th eo ry of illumin a tive
a?s tracti o n , but he docs c riti cize him ro r insist in g th at th e se nses a lo ne pe rceive indiVidua ls as individua ls o f a certa in kind th e very assumption that makes possible a ny
th eory o r illuminative abst racti o n (K a hn 1992, 37 1 r. no te 24). H owever, Themistius
makes no s uch mistake. See Gabbe 2008b for Themistiu 's accou nt of incide ntal perception.
23 Tay lor 2007 , 128 and 136.
24 Taylor 2007, 135 r.
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thoughts and it does so via illuminative abstraction and form s that preexist
in the tran cendent intell ect.
If Themistius does believe the productive intellect to think the extent of
what hum a ns can know, th en there is no getting around it - he ascribes to
Ar istotle a theory of intuition. Indeed, two rem a rks would lead one to this
supposition. We are told that the productive intellect " has all the form s all
together" ( 100,9) and that, in order for the potential intellect to be capable
o[ knowing all things, it mu st think "all objects" (103,30- 32). But these
remarks mu st be ta ken in their proper context. Themistius makes the
rirst remark hortly after exp lai nin g that the productive intellect does not
think the fo rm of the nat ura l wo rld . H e write: " Bein g both intellect a nd
object of thought, it is precisely th e same, [... a nd not] on acco unt of an other [o bject] , like the remainin g objects of thought that the intellect we'
E~ IV produces by se paratin g them [rom matter" (99,38- 100,3). The inte llect
Kae' E~IV - the intellect with the disposition to think - apprehends the [orms
o[ the natural world by se parating them [rom their particularizing conditions. Hence, becau e the apprehension of these forms depends upon the
ex istence of sensible objects a nd because the productive intellect's activity
a nd essence a re due to itself, Themistius concludes th at it cannot think
them.
That Themistius's productive intell ect thinks less objects than its potenti a l co unterpa rt is further ev idenced by his response to the objection that
superiority is commensurate with the number of objects thought. He writes:
"a more va lu able intellect is not one that thinks a greater number of [objects], but one th at thinks better [objects]" ( 11 2,6). In Themistius's view, the
rirst cau e can think only itself, "what is form most of all" (112,2). This is
because it co mplete detachment from potentiality a nd privation precludes
it from thinking a nything else. His productive intellect, by contrast, is intimately tied to the natural world and so is not quite as limited as the first
ca use. However, because it too lacks potentiality, it cannot cognize privations, matter, and objects that are bad ( 114,36- 11 5, 1). Because the definitions of nat ural objects implicate (CJVVE<pEAKETOl) matter (7,29; 114,2 1),
only the hum a n intellect, which manifests potentiality, can think them.
For Themistius, most of what we come to know, including the principles
of science, are not intuited by cosmic transmission or participation. Our
abi lity to apprehend forms does not depend upon access we have to forms
that exist separately from the physical world. Wh at, then, does he mean
when he describes the productive intellect as havi ng "all the forms all together" (l00,9) a nd thinking "all objects" (103,30- 32)? I suggest that the
' a ll ' in these quotes is qualified. It does not mean 'all that there is to know ',
but 'all that it does and must of necessity know'.
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IV

Let us begin our investigation into the productive intellect's role and function afresh, since our analy is has so far been negative. Themistius reports
that the productive intellect furni hes the potential intellect with a E~IS for
VOEIV: " it perfects the suitability (EV<pV{OV) of the oul for thinkin g (TO VOEIV),
and fully constitute its dispo ition (E~ IV KOToaKEv6l;El)" (98,31 f.) . Genera ll y speaking, Themistiu could mean one of two things: either that the
productive intellect perfects the potential intellect as the proximate cause
of its knowledge, that it does so indirectly by giving the potential intellect
the power to acquire the objects of thou ght by itself. The prevailing view
takes Themistius to espouse the form er position insofar as it presumes the
productive intellect to actualize intelligible forms by dirCl:t action o n the
images. The assumption i th at the potential intellect cannot gain insight
into the causes and essences of things by itself, and so, in order for it to
VOEIV, it must be stockpiled with the forms. The alternative view, by contrast,
allows the potential intellect to acquire knowledge by means of the ability it
receives from the productive intellect to think in the broade t sense of the
word .
The first place to look for clarity on thi s issue is Themistius's account of
VOEIV, which can construed as evidence for the prevailing view much in the
way that certain of Aristotle's remarks can be taken as evidence for orne
kind of divine insight. Themistius reports that VOEIV is the grasping of
the simple definitions (TOUS CnTAOVS opovs, 30,25) and involves the direct encounter (E1Tl!30Arl) and contact (e{~IS) with the objects of thought (30,32).
However, he later reports that " the intellect's E1Tl!30Arl with the objects of
thought for someone who already has the E~ IV is, just as the activity and E1Tl!30ATj of a speciali st relative to his objects, not a movement but an activity,
since it is of something perfect and is perfect itself" ( 11 2,30 32).25 This remark suggests that he understands E1Tl!30Arl and e{~IS to indicate the insight
we obtain once in possess ion of knowledge, rather than a mode by which we
apprehend the objects. Moreover, he interprets Ari totle ' description of the
objects of thought as uncombined as a reOection of the unity of the thing
known and the intellect's general abi lity to think in a n indivisible amount of
time. 26 The intellect, he states, doe the ame when it combines these simple
things signified in an act of discur ive thinking: "This <abi lity> is just one
of the marvels of the intellect" (110,22).
But might Themistius countenance non-propositional thinking nonetheless? In his J 970 article, A. C. Lloyd argued that non-propo itional thinking, what he understand s by VOEIV, is a genuine form of thinking. On the
25

26

Cr. 111 de WI . 30 32 a nd 111 , 18 24.
Themistius devotes muc h of his paraphrase of chapter six of book three of the De
A nill/o to thi s iss ue. Sec, in particu lar, In de all. 109,4 11 2,24.
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assumption that OlOVOElcy6m (discursive thinking) differs from VOEIV in that
it involves the transition from one thought to the next, Lloyd supposes that
it must be possible to VOEIV concepts apart from their occurrence within a
proposition. This would happen, he argues, if a person were interrupted in
the course of thinking a propositional statement. And in this case, the perSon would know and think of some object without thinking anything about
it. Hence, in his view, OlOVOElcy6m requires vOElv.
Themistius addres es the question of whether VOEIV is a part of OlOVOEICY6ol. And were he to draw the same conclusion as Lloyd, we would have
grounds for supposing, not just that VOEIV is for him non-propositional, but
also that his productive intellect operates as a proximate cause of the objects of thought. For on this account of OlOvoElcy6m, the grasping of the
simple definitions would be required for the most basic type of thinking
and , hence, the potential intel lect wou ld be precluded from acquiring its objects through ordinary reflection . However, Themistius's concern in addressing this question reveals that he does not share Lloyd's account ofvoElv
and OlOVOElcy6ol. Themistius writes that if OlOVOElcy6m involved vOElv, then
the lesser activity would require the superior. It would be as if the craftsman'sjob were to know wood a nd stone in and of themselves, as opposed to
knowing them only in their combination (30,28- 30). Accordingly, Themistius distinguishes the two kinds of thinking, not in terms of their mode of
apprehension, but in terms of their relation to the objects of thought:
Just like the contrast between poor sight and clear vision, VOEIV involves an E TTl~oATj
(direct encounter) and 6i~ls (contact) with the object of thought, whereas CiovoEla601 is
like a movement in the direction of the object that amounts to an approach in a state
too weak to retain the object without its being dispersed. (30,32- 34).

LllOvoElcy6m , we are told, describes the kind of thinking used to obtain

knowledge of the object, VOEIV the thinking employed once knowledge
is achieved. Hence, he calls the objects combined in discursive thinking "the
simple things signified" as opposed to " the simple things defined", his preferred expression for the objects of vOElv. 27
We can learn more a bout the productive intellect's role in human thought
by examining Themistius's account of intellectual development in the
passage quoted below. As we shall see, there is no explicit mention of the
productive intellect here (Themistius has yet to introduce it); however, when
this passage is paired with a later description of the productive intellect's
effect on its potential counterpart, a picture emerges of what state it brings
about and how. Themistius writes:
N o w this potential intellect comes into existence even among infants. But when, from
th e objects of perce ption ((mo TWV ola61lTwv) and imaginings of them (TWV (me)
TOIJTWV cpo vTo alwv ) a nd the training associated with them (TTjS TIEpi TOVTO yv~voaios),
27

f. 109,6, 10, 18; 11 2, 14; and 30,24f.
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it is able to hunt the unive rsa l and group together what is similar in dissimilar objects
and what is identica l in dilTerent objects (,6 KaeOAOV 5uvT),aI eT)peUelV Kai avv6:yelv ,6
OIJ010V EV ,OlS aVOIJOi01S Koi ,6 ,a\lTov ~v ,015 510<p0P0l5), it then becomes a more perfect intellect, analogous to so meone with specialized knowledge who has latched on to
the theorems of his discipline and is able to be active by himself by making each of
them individually avai lable for himself, without the need for any external instruction.
At that tage too, therefore, the intellect is in potentiality, ye t not in the sa me way as before it learnt (IJOeelv) or made discovcries (eupelv). For some thing like thc capacity for
sight, not previously prese nt in it, comes to be in it, in that it can see similar and dissimi la r objects, and what [in those objects) is identical a nd dilTerent, a nd is implied a nd
is in connict (eyyivETaI yap olov 0\1'15 a\1T0 lTpooepov OUK evovao OpO'IKT] ,c;:,v olJoiwv
Kai , c;:,v avo lJoiwv Koi hepov Kai aKOAOUeOV Koi lJoxolJevov). (95,9 19)

Described above are two levels of intellectual ach ievcment. '[ he first level of
perfection corresponds to the achievement of an ordinary pcrson who has
not received a specialized education. This person has a grasp of universal
concepts such that she can appropriately group together (avvaYElv) dissimilar things and recognize when discrete objects share certain features or
causes in common. She is not, however, able to articulate fully what essentially characterizes the groups of objects, because she cannot provide definitions or articulate the causes of why some thing or fact is so. Thus, she
has linguistic competency, but only a non-scientific gra p of the concepts
she uses. By contrast, the second level of perfection characterizes someone
who has obtained scientific and theoretical knowledge. Themistius reports
that obtaining this level of expertise requires knowing the totality of theorems belonging to that discipline (95,23 25). A person with this knowledge
will have in her command the primary definitions and axioms, as well as
the propo itions or theorems derived from them. And her knowled ge will be
evidenced by her ability to call the axioms and theorems to mind without
external aid.
It will prove useful to make a few observations about the quote above before turning to our second passage. The first thing to note is that the two levels of intellectual completion are brought about in entirely different ways.
Linguistic competency requires the activity of the sense faculties alongside
some training associated with them; scientific and theoretica l understanding require learning and discovery. Second, there is nothing my terious
or magical about how either of these E~EIS are obtained . The intellect develops from sense-experience and training led by our parents and caregivers.
By means of these activities, we learn to group together things that are
relevantly similar and apply generalized terms to objects, attributes, and
phenomena. We seek the principles and theorems of a cience using our
weak and inchoate grasp of the universal , because at this point we possess
language skills by which we can learn through enquiry and study. Third, the
only remark in the quote above that could resonate with the proponent of
the illumination theory involves the reference to the capacity for sight that
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springs up during some late stage of our development (95 , 17 f.). One might
think that this capacity refers to the productive intellect. However, our
newly endowed ' vision' does not explain our ability to apprehend or acquire
forms ; rather, it characterizes our state once in possession of knowledge.
With knowledge we have the ability to see with clarity and precision what is
similar and identical in different objects and what it is implied by and in
conf1ict with this piece of understanding. And we might note that Themistius's use of vision is here consistent with his use of bTl~oATj and ei ~ I S.
It is striking that Alexand er of Aphrodisias also recognizes these same level s of intellectual perfection , because he does not conceive the productive
intellect as the proximate cause of our thoughts. 28 Like Themistius, Alexander maintains that the perfected or ' acquired' intellect possesses scientific
and theoretical knowledge. 29 He explains that this E~IS is characterized by
the knower's (or intellect's) ability to think in absence of external resources
and holds that it belongs only to the most gifted and disciplined. Moreover,
Alexander concedes that all humans share in this E~IS insofar as we all have
some apprehension of the universal and some synthetic knowiedge 30 - that
is to ay, insofar as we all have linguistic competency and some common
sense. According to Alexand e r, th is first level of perfection is acquired as we
grow and mature much in th e way that we learn to walk: it develops naturally with some practice over time.31
The productive intellect, in Alexa nder's view, plays only an indirect role
in the acquisition of knowledge. Alexander explain that what is being most
or all , or what most especially manifests some property, is the cause of other
things and properties of this sort (88 ,26- 89, 1). Therefore, since the productive intellect is the most intelligible of beings (88 ,25) , it is the cause of all
things intelligible. Still , he does not mean that the productive intellect produces actual thoughts; for it does not communicate form or illuminate
those contained in images. It is responsible for the intelligibility of the cosmos in sofa r as it is the ultimate cau se of its structure, order, stability and
bea uty th e very qu a lities that make it knowable.

28

29
30

II

Alexa nd er's De Allima is not exactly a commenta ry on Aristot le's. He wrote one, but it
is now lost. Yet becau e he end orses Aristotle's account or the oul, his treatise reads
like a n ex position or hi mas ter's. See DA 2,4- 9.
See, ro r insta nce, Alex . DA 82, I 3.
Alexa nd e r states that it is bes t to call the intellect that has obtained this first level of
achievement the " commo n intellect" (0 KOIVOS vovs) as o pposed to the " acquired intellect" his na me ror th e intcllect possessed or scientific know ledge (82, 14) . Themistius a lso recogni zes a common intellect, but he identifies it with Aristotle's TTo61lT1KOS
vovs. Compa re lines 106, 14r. ofThemistius's paraphrase with lines 430a23- 25 or Aristotl e's De Anima.
See Alex. DA 82, I 15. Themistius also a nalogize intellectua l development to walking
a nd then running (111 0/1 . post. 65,24- 28 ).
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That Themistius also does not make the productive intellect the proximate cause of our thoughts can be argued from analysis of the following
passage, wherein he describes the potential intellect before and after being
affected by the productive intellect:
[The] actual intellect a dva nce ' the potential intellect, and not only makes it an actual
intellect, but also constitutes its potential objects of thought as actual objects. These
are the enmatlered forms, i. e. , the universal thoughts (Kolva VOTj~OTO) assembled
from particular objects of perception. Up to this point the potential intellect cannot
di scern (51 0 Kpivat) <the universal thou ghts>, make transitions from one thought to the
other, or combine and divide them. Instead , like a store-house of thought s (e"crovpos
VO"~CXTWV) , it deposits (T ie"crIV) the imprints from perception and imagination through
the agency of memory. But when the productive inte llect e nco unte rs it lind ta kes over
this ' matter' of thou ghts, the potential intellect beco mes one with it, a nd beco mes able
to make transition s, and to combine and divide thou g hts a nd to obse rve thou ghts from
the [perspective of] one another. (99, I 10)

The passage opens with the claim that the productive intellect furnishes the
potential intellect with the objects of thought. He describes these as the enmattered forms, having in mind the intelligible forms of natural and mathematical en tities. Prior to its join ing with the productive intellect, the potential intellect cannot in any way apprehend the forms apart from their matter
and, therefore, cannot form propositions, make judgments or draw inferences. In other words, it cannot think di cursively because it does not have
concepts at its disposal. Its work consists so lely in the depositing of "imprints from perception and imagination through the agency of memory"
(99,7f.). At this point, the potential intellect is cognizant of the meld of
sense-experiences preserved by imagination and memory but unable to
make any sense of them. Thus, we can conclude that the productive intellect
enters the human soul before the individual begins to attach words to objects and that it has some role in the actualization of both E~EIS.
There is nothing in this passage to suggest that the productive intellect
perfects the potential intellect at either stage by its power to illuminate
images and stockpile it with the forms. Themistius says that we acquire concepts by tracking or hunting down (6TlPEVEIV) the uni versal from the objects
of perception (95, II ). 32 The verb 6TlPEVEIV itself suggests that the search
for the universal is a process unfolding over time - a process that can admit
of error. In fact, Themistius typically uses 6TlPEVEIV in place of, or in connection with, some kind of inquiry. 33 And while concept mastery cannot
involve a genuine inquiry at this stage of our intellectual development we
do not have lin gu istic compete ncy - his verb cho ice suggests that, at the
very least, it involves some kind of procedure with regard to our sense-per32
33

Aristotle uses thi s verb in All. post. 131 , 88a3 in connection with our earch for the
universal.
Cf. his u e ofe"pevEIV at lines 5, 10, 42,8 and 49 ,34 of his paraphrase of the De Allima .

Themistius o n Co ncep t Acquisition a nd Knowled ge of Essences

231

ception s. Moreover, if the productive intellect gives to the potential intellect
the capacity to track down the universal , then for Themistius, our abi lity to
engage our intellects must happen before they are stockpiled with concepts.
The prevailing interpretation cannot accommodate this idea. Scholars insist that the productive intellect is required for the actua lization of the intelli gible objects on the assumption that the potential intellect lacks the
age ncy to think prior to being possessed of the forms. Yet the suggestio n of
th e above passage is that th e productive intellect perfects its potential
counterpart by giving it the ability to form concepts by itself.
Now if the productive intellect is not the proximate cause of concept acqui sition, it does not provide us with insight into definitions and essences
either. Themistius tells us that discursive reasoning advances us to knowledge of the object (30,32-34), that "we ought [... ] more than anything else
inquire (l;llTEiv) into the forms without matter" (112,23), and that " the intellect Ko6' E~ l V (pres umably, the intellect possessed of universal concepts)
produces the objects of thought by separating them from matter" (100,2 f.).
Ind eed, we see him put these ideas into practice in the opening to his paraphrase. In De Anima I 1, Ari stotle di scusses how best to approach the inquiry into the so ul. Themistius gives substantial attention to this introductory chapter and reports that the follow ing are useful for discovering
essence a nd articulating defini tions: (a) understa nding the problems that
beset an inquiry (5,1- 3); (b) tallying the properties of the object under investigation (5,3- 26); and (c) considering the opinions of one's predecessors
(8,38- 9,2). The e observations and reflections, Themistius notes, will not
necessa rily or universa lly lead to a correct definition , because there is no
sin gle way of seeking definition s (5 ,26- 30). The task , he says, is very difficu lt a nd he rema rks that the methodology for providing definitions was
under dispute even in his day:
Fo r even today it is disputed among philoso phers what in general the method of delinition is, and by wha t procedure it progresses [... ]. For [. ..] so me believe that th ere is a
single method [... but] ot her [believe] that [.. .] the ways of dealin g with delinitions
differ in accordance with diffe rences in things th at exist. (2,9- 16)

Such sensitivities fly in the face of the illumination reading. We could
hardly be mistaken or struggle to find the best approach to the discovery of
a definition , if the productive intellect makes essential natures manifest to
LI S. It looks, then, as if Themi stius takes the productive intellect to actualize
its po tential counterpart by giving it th e ab ility, first, to acquire concepts,
and, then , by means of ordinary thinking, to discover definitions and
essences. But if this is the case, then we must conclude that his productive
intellect plays only an indirect rol e in the actualization of the intelligible
form s.
There is clear precedence for this kind of approach to knowledge
formation in the Mantissa, a treatise on the intellect attributed to Alex-

232

Myrna Gabbe

ander of Aphrodisias. 34 In this work , it is explained that the productive intellect perfects the potential intellect by being thought. The theory is that by
thinking the productive intellect, what lacks a\l matter, we obtain the impetus and ability to acquire the objects of thought from images produced by
sense-perception. The productive intellect serves as a model to imitate and,
thereby, gives us the ability to separate and abstract form from matter
(l 08, 19- 26). It remains, then, for us to say how in Themistius's view the productive intellect furnishes its potential counterpart with the ability to learn
and think. I have so far argued that the productive intellect does not literally
illuminate forms in images, but the same cannot be said for its role as communicator. Thus our question becomes: What form s does the productive
intellect channel to its potential counterpart so as to give it the ability to acquire concepts and knowledge for itself?
Because Themistius did not make his views explicit, we can only speculate as to what he had in mind. Davidson suggests that the productive intellect directly communicates the shared notions and the primary definitions
and axioms. His evidence comes from the following passage:
There is no need to be puzzled if we who are combined from the potential and actual
[intellects] are referred back to o ne prod uctive intellect [oo.]. Where otherwise do the
shared notions (Kolval Evvol a l) come from? Where is the untaught and identica l understanding of the primary definitions (rrp(;'>Twv o pwv) and primary axioms (rrpwTU)v
6:~IW~CXTWV) derived from? For we would not understand one another unless there were
a single intellect that we all shared. (103,36 104,3)

It is easy to see how Davidson arrived at his interpretation. Insofar as the
primary definitions and axioms are untaught, they might very well be channeled directly to and , thus, intuited by the potential intellect. 35 However,
Themistius earlier reported that "the primary definitions are those forms
that the intellect thinks by extraction from matter" (22,5 f.). Thus, the primary definitions are known from sense-perception and, presumably, untaught insofar as they cannot be demonstratively proven.
I have a different suggestion founded upon Themistius's characterization
of linguistic competency and scientific knowledge. Recall that he characterizes concept mastery in terms of the ability "to group together (avv6YEIV)
what is similar in dissimilar objects and what is the same in diffe rent things"
(95,11 f.) and knowledge in terms of seeing "similar and dissimilar objects

34

35

Because of the discrepancies between Alexander's De Anima and the Mantissa , it is
not clear whether the latter is a genuine treatise or whether the connicts are a manifestation of it being either an earlier or later work with respect to the former.
I take it that Themistius is here referring to the common and proper principles of a
science. [n Posterior Analytics 1 10, Aristotle distinguishes between principles that are
common to all sciences, such as the principle of non-contradiction and the proposition that equals removed from equals leaves equals. The proper principles are the defi nitions or axioms of the things with which a particu lar science is concerned.
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and what [in th ose objects] is the same and different, and is implied and in
con flict " (95, 17- 19). What is striking is his casting of these rational states in
terms of our varying ability to discern similarity, sameness and difference.
Themistius u ses si milar expressions to explain the acquisition of the first
principles (or prim a ry definitions) in hi s paraphrase of the Posterior Analy rics. There he reports that human beings "are able to un ite (crvvcmTEtv)
simila r things and apply <the universal to them> " (63,13). He goes on to
say th at this ability mark s the difference between hum an bein gs and animals; for a ll animals have the co nn ate capacity for sense-perception, the
so urce of o ur knowledge, but we alone can grasp the first principles. We can
"group togeth er what is one among the many, what does not differ among
th e differing an d what is the sa me in the different (TO EV EK TTOAAWV Kai TO
6:5tc'x<popov EK 5ta<popwv Kai Ta\~JTOV E~ ETepwv crVVc'xYEt)" (64,10f.) .36
This problem that Themistius raises - why it is that animals cannot discern the first principles - stems from the assumption that sense-perception
gen uinely supplies the foundation for our understanding. Thus, he makes
much of Aristotle's claim that perception is, in some manner, of the universa L3? According to Themistius, we perceive essential characteristics. "When
one sees Socrates, he at the same time sees in him what is similar to the
other and what is shared " (64,6f.). Still, Themistius is quick to note that
there is a bi g difference between se nse-perception and intellection. The
sen es may perceive the universal, but it does so as commingled with matter
and particularity (64,8 f.). The job of the intellect is " to separate, abstract
an d know the universal with respect to itself" (64,8).
The theory so far is that the potential intellect acquires linguistic competency and scientific knowledge through its ability to organize and systematize the information it receives from the senses. Basically, we acquire the
ability to a pply universal terms correctly from the practice of grouping
together an d separating things a ppropriately, and later, come to know wh at
binds the gro ups together a nd what distinguishes one group of things from
a nother by studying and reflecting on the relevant objects that have been so
arranged. My proposal , then, is that productive intellect gives to its potential counterpart the ability to assemble, arrange and organize one's experiences and, therefore, gives to it the understanding of sameness and difference - the concepts necessary for the ordering of our sense-perceptions.
These relationa l concepts are among the few that Themistius's productive
intellect can think. Moreover, Sameness and Difference are two of the
three ent ities that constitute Plato's soul in the Tim aeus. (Being is the third.)
On the principle that like knows like, Sameness and Difference enable the
soul to know the Forms, as well as the constituents of the sensible realm .
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Contrast this remark from hi s trea tise on th e Poslerior Ana/ylies with lines 95, II f. in
his paraphrase of the De Allima .
eeAII.poSI.87b29a nd IOOaI 7.

234

M y rn a Gabbe

Thcmistius describes Plato 's theory in book onc of hi s paraphrase, and explains his intuition a follow: " When <thc oul> groups (avv6:YlJ) the genera and species together, it traces out sa meness (-nlv ,-cx~1T6'-T)'-cx 6:VIXVEVEI),
but when it grasps besides the differences ('-05 OICX<jl0POS TIpOaACXI-lI36:vlJ),
it discovers difference ('-llV hEp6'-T)'-cx E~Evp(aKE I) " (11,8- 10). 38 Notable is
the similarity of language by which he characterizes learning for both Aristotle and Plato. I have argued that Themistius doe not ascribe to Aristotle
a Platonic kind of intellectual intuition or vi ion. However, he certainly appreciates Plato 's contribution and, I believe, puts it to use in a creative and
Aristotelian way.39
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